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Turcotte: Victory on the Potomac

strategists seeking to understand the
war in some form less than book size.
Arkin advises readers not to be deceived
by appearances or Powerpoint briefings
on just what decided victory for the
Nato allies. The article certainly should
replace the disingenuous official
Kosovo report by the secretary of defense used in the curriculum of the
Naval War College and other service
schools.
However, the Arkin piece is only the
appetizer. There is insufficient room to
highlight all the fine articles in this review, but two struck this reviewer between the eyes. In the first, Anatol
Lieven warns American “hawks” not to
believe Kosovo is a model for future
wars but that the conflict “will persuade
. . . adversaries to confront the West indirectly, using nonstate actors.” This
was written before 11 September 2002.
Lieven points out that the chaotic, decentralized, and violent nature of likely
future conflict environments, including
Afghanistan, can negate the hightechnology advantages of the West,
forcing the fighting down to earth on
conditions more to the liking of the enemy. Reading Lieven, and then watching General Tommy Franks tell U.S.
troops in Afghanistan that the war will
be a long one, made this reviewer’s
hands cold and sweaty. In the second
article, Andrew Bacevich conducts a revisionist tour de force describing the
evolution of the Clausewitzian “remarkable trinity” as it applies to the
United States, focusing especially on the
latest changes effected by the Clinton
administration and first demonstrated
in Kosovo. At the risk of simplification,
Bacevich would have the current trinity
composed of a globally involved government able to use a professional, not
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conscript, armed force wherever it
wants in face of an uninterested public—
as long as the conflict is quick and
bloodless. Whether or not one agrees
with Bacevich’s premise and findings,
the power and flow of the author’s conceptualization is truly impressive.
This is a necessary book for those who
teach and practice national security.
The writing and thinking are deep and
compelling. One must congratulate the
editors for their selections. One also
must hope that defense decision makers, as well as students who will form
the next generation of leadership, will
read and pay serious attention to the
works in this book.
JON CZARNECKI

Associate Professor of Joint Maritime Operations
Naval War College, Monterey Program

Locher, James R., III. Victory on the Potomac.
College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2002.
507pp. $34.95

Jim Locher describes the history of the
intense bureaucratic struggle to redesign relationships between the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, secretary of defense, the president, and Congress. The prolonged
struggle culminated in the GoldwaterNichols Act of 1986. This document is
thought by many to be the most sweeping military reform of the last forty
years. Senators Barry Goldwater and
Sam Nunn believed the system was broken and consequently was providing
low-quality military advice to the
secretary of defense. Others, particularly the service chiefs and the secretary
of defense, strongly disagreed with this
assessment. Victory on the Potomac
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represents a dramatic, detailed, and
sometimes entertaining description of
the prolonged hardball political maneuvering and bureaucratic infighting between those for and those against
reform. Locher colorfully describes the
tactics and personalities of the key figures involved in the debate. He begins
with the long and difficult history of efforts made during the Harry Truman
and Dwight Eisenhower era to reform the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and to strengthen the
role of its chairman. Locher then focuses on Senator Goldwater, Senator
Nunn, Representative Ike Skelton, Representative Bill Nichols, and key staffs’
detailed strategy for reform. Their efforts led to bitter confrontations with
senior military and civilian leaders who
held the view that proposed legislation
would cripple the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s
influence. Of particular interest is Secretary of the Navy John Lehman’s total
opposition to the legislative proposals
and his tactics to outflank the legislators and, indeed, at times to outflank
his own boss, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Locher also describes
the particular difficulties for senior military officers favoring reform. Individuals like Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.,
exhibited the utmost delicacy in balancing personal beliefs with the Pentagon’s
antireform stand.
Although the book emphasizes the
Goldwater-Nichols struggle, it is a textbook on the complexities and strategies
of bureaucratic politics fought for high
stakes between the legislative and executive branches. Emotion, parochialism,
and legitimate beliefs conflict and, at
times, become highly personal. Students of government politics will find
that the book adds generously to insights on the dynamics of gaining
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support for, or fighting against, significant legislative proposals. Readers with
serious interest in national security policy formulation will benefit from the
detailed examination of how arguments
are developed, coalitions are constructed, and past history (such as Lebanon and Grenada) is marshaled to
support either side of a debate. Those
who favored reform will marvel at the
persistence and political skill of the advocates. Those opposed will, no doubt,
regard many of the described political
tactics as unfair and perhaps unethical.
In an excellent epilogue, Locher reiterates the original purposes for the legislation and uses them to evaluate the
present success of the GoldwaterNichols Act provisions. His analysis has
balance and notes that the behaviorial
changes sought have not been fully realized, but he does conclude that the legislation “made significant and positive
contributions in improving the quality
of military advice.” Locher observes
that this judgment is shared by principal customers of the Joint Staff and by
senior Joint Staff practitioners. Those
who believe that significant improvement has resulted include former
secretary of defense Dick Cheney,
Colin Powell, and General John M.
Shalikashvilli. In a separate book of his
own, Admiral Crowe, the first chairman
under Goldwater-Nichols, noted that
the increased authority of the chairman
was a significant benefit and not overly
contested by the heads of service. Increasing the authority of the regional
commanders was thought to add much
to their capability for fulfilling warfighting roles. General Powell added
that the Joint Staff had “improved so
dramatically [that] it had become the
premier military staff in the world.”
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The epilogue also examines disappointments, including the observation that
“the Pentagon still lacks a vision of its
needs for Joint officers and how to prepare and reward them.”
Locher is a graduate of West Point and
the Harvard Business School. He was a
leading Goldwater-Nichols strategist on
the staff of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services. He is the authority on
the detailed political pulls and tugs that
brought Goldwater-Nichols into existence. While Locher strives for a balanced analysis, his commitment to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and his own
key role in that process result in a more
detailed examination of the proponents’
view while giving less detail to the arguments of the opponents. Some of the
opponents he classifies as excessively parochial, while others are characterized as
ignoring obvious system flaws.
Goldwater-Nichols has had an unquestioned major effect on the Joint Staff
process and on officer education. It is
and will be for many years, the subject
of intensive debate and analysis.
Locher’s book will be an important reference in this debate (and in turn, his
article “Has It Worked? The GoldwaterNichols Reorganization Act,” in the
Autumn 2001 issue of this journal, is a
good introduction to it). I strongly recommend that anyone interested or involved in the national security process
read this book. It describes democracy
at work and just how hard that process
can be.
WILLIAM TURCOTTE

Professor Emeritus
Naval War College
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Shachtman, Tom. Terrors and Marvels: How Science and Technology Changed the Character and
Outcome of World War II. New York: William
Morrow, 2002. 360pp. $26.95

Tom Schachtman’s brief history of the
influence of science and technology on
World War II needs less “gee whiz” and
more John McPhee. As in the war itself,
the author’s strategic decisions are critical to the book’s successes and failures.
The successes can be quickly acknowledged. The book is well written.
Shachtman shows a good familiarity
with the oral histories and memoirs of
the most prominent scientists. He is interesting when identifying personalities
and providing biographical material to
enliven the narrative. He also correctly
treats most of the significant scientifictechnical developments of the war: the
exploitation of the electromagnetic
spectrum for command and control,
navigation, and target acquisition;
guidance systems for such ordnance as
acoustic torpedoes and proximity-fused
shells; nuclear weapons; signals intelligence; jet propulsion; and chemical and
biological warfare.
Now I’ll drop the other cyclotron. Terrors and Marvels does too little with too
much, and it suffers from Shachtman’s
attempt to be international and chronological. Except for the fact that somehow the Allies “did better science” than
the Axis (all those refugees from Nazism certainly helped), the author offers
little explanation of how all these Allied
wonder weapons, crypto dominance,
and radar-sonar devices came about. If
Shachtman had written separate chapters on his prize weapons, one would be
far the wiser about the scientific and
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